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Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany†
By Nadja Dwenger, Henrik Kleven, Imran Rasul, 
and Johannes Rincke*
We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in 
the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system has 
historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at 
baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deterrence 
baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized 
compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative 
records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treatments 
to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is substantial, 
that a significant fraction of it may be driven by  duty-to-comply 
preferences, and that there is no  crowd-out between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations. (JEL C93, D64, H26, H71, K34, Z12)
Is tax compliance driven only by extrinsic motivations related to deterrence and tax policy, or is there also a role for intrinsic motivations such as morals, norms, 
and duty? The economic theory of tax compliance building on Becker (1968) and 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) focuses only on the former and predicts low compli-
ance under low audit probabilities or penalties. This prediction stands in sharp con-
trast to the empirical observation that tax compliance is high in modern tax systems 
despite very low audit probabilities and modest penalties. The literature has pro-
posed three ways of resolving this compliance puzzle (e.g., Sandmo 2005; Slemrod 
2007; Kleven 2014).
First, modern tax systems make widespread use of  third-party information from 
firms and the financial sector, which creates a divergence between observed audit 
rates and actual detection probabilities conditional on evading (Kleven, Kreiner, 
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and Saez 2009; Kleven et al. 2011). Hence, the notion that deterrence is weak is to 
some extent an illusion. Second, theory assumes that taxpayers have perfect knowl-
edge of deterrence parameters, but in practice there may be misperception. Survey 
evidence suggests individuals tend to overestimate audit probabilities and penalties 
associated with tax evasion (Scholz and Pinney 1995; Chetty 2009). Third, individ-
uals may comply due to a wide range of  non-pecuniary motivations including moral 
sentiments, guilt, reciprocity, and social norms (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 
1998; Luttmer and Singhal 2014). We label all such motivations under the umbrella 
term intrinsic motivations. The importance of such intrinsic motivations for com-
pliance is the hardest to measure and study empirically, and therefore the least well 
understood.
We consider a context and natural field experiment that provides new insights 
on the second and third explanations for the compliance puzzle. In our setting 
 third-party information reporting is not implemented, and our field experiment is 
designed to reveal extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to comply through the provi-
sion of two forms of incentive: (i) the injection of positive deterrence; and (ii) the 
provision of compliance rewards/recognition.
Our setting is the local church tax in a metropolitan region of Bavaria, Germany. 
Three features of this setting are important for the empirical analysis. First, it 
combines taxation with charitable giving: the church tax is compulsory and 
 noncompliance represents a violation of tax law, but the church highlights the good 
cause and encourages overpayments that are defined as donations. Hence, tax evad-
ers and donors can coexist in this system. Second, the true tax base relevant for 
the church is defined as reported taxable income to the government, which we can 
perfectly observe for each individual by linking church tax records to administra-
tive income tax records. This allows us to compare actual church taxes paid with 
true taxes owed for each individual, and thus precisely distinguish between evaders, 
compliers, and donors. This overcomes a key limitation of most tax evasion studies, 
namely that the outcome of interest is not observed (Slemrod and Weber 2012). 
Third, even though the church has the legal right to  cross-check filed taxes against 
income tax returns (which would detect evasion with certainty), they have not previ-
ously exercised this right. In other words, prior to our field experiment there is zero 
deterrence in this tax system. Together with the previous point, this implies we can 
observe compliance in a baseline with zero deterrence, providing a direct measure 
of intrinsically motivated tax compliance.
To guide the empirical analysis, we set out a conceptual framework that unifies 
the standard compliance model (Allingham and Sandmo 1972) with the  warm-glow 
model of public goods contributions (Andreoni 1989, 1990). The framework incor-
porates heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation to allow for the coexistence of evad-
ers, compliers, and donors, as in our empirical setting. We use this to characterize 
the heterogeneous impacts of compliance incentives on evader and donor types. 
Our empirical analysis distinguishes throughout between the treatment responses 
of extrinsically motivated individuals (those who evade in the zero deterrence base-
line) and the responses of intrinsically motivated individuals (those who comply or 
donate in the zero deterrence baseline). Our empirical measure of these motivational 
types is compelling, because our linked panel data from administrative tax records 
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and church records allows us to classify individuals into behavioral types using their 
actual  pretreatment compliance behavior.
Our natural field experiment is implemented in collaboration with the Protestant 
church. We vary the compliance incentives individuals face by manipulating the 
official tax notification sent to collect the local church tax:  40,000 individual tax 
payers were randomly assigned to a control group or to 1 of 12 treatments. These 
treatments varied along three dimensions. The first set of treatments simplify the 
payment of the tax, and aim to correct any misperceptions individuals may have 
on audit probabilities. The second set of treatments vary the deterrence parameters 
individuals face. We do this through the announcement of strictly positive audit 
probabilities, including both fixed probabilities on all taxpayers and notched proba-
bilities that depend on the tax payment. The third set of treatments offer compliance 
rewards in the form of social recognition, entry into monetary prize draws, or a 
combination of the two.
Our main findings are as follows. First, a significant fraction of individuals com-
ply in the zero deterrence baseline where compliance should be zero absent intrinsic 
motivations. Around  20 percent of individuals pay at least the true taxes owed, while 
the remaining  80 percent of individuals evade taxes and most of them fully evade. 
Hence, intrinsic motivations can account for a substantial amount of aggregate com-
pliance, but these motives are strongly heterogeneous in the population. The large 
majority of individuals behave as rational,  self-interested taxpayers consistent with 
the  Becker-Allingham-Sandmo framework.
Second, there is sharp bunching at exact compliance in the zero deterrence base-
line. As there is no extrinsic incentive to locate at exact compliance under zero 
deterrence, such excess bunching requires either a discontinuity in intrinsic moti-
vation at the point of exact compliance, naturally labeled as a “duty to comply,” or 
the presence of attention or focal point effects of exact compliance. While it is in 
general difficult to distinguish between these explanations, we exploit our simplifi-
cation treatment (which makes the point of exact compliance more salient) to shed 
light on this. We find that the simplification treatment does not increase bunching at 
exact compliance, suggesting that bunching may be driven more by  duty-to-comply 
preferences.
Third, announcing a zero audit probability (the status quo) has only a small 
impact on compliance, suggesting there is little misperception on average. Less than 
5 percent of baseline compliance can be attributed to misperception of the audit 
probability, and hence this is not an important confounder in the measurement of 
baseline intrinsic motivation.
Fourth, tax simplification and deterrence have strong effects on compliance for 
baseline evaders, but small and mostly insignificant effects for baseline donors. 
As the enforcement constraint is not binding for baseline donors, deterrence does 
not directly affect their extrinsic incentives to comply, and hence they should only 
respond to this treatment if there is  crowd-out or  crowd-in between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations. Our findings are therefore consistent with the absence of 
 cross-effects between the two types of motivation.
Finally, the provision of compliance rewards has fundamentally different impacts 
on baseline donors (who increase their donations) and baseline evaders (who increase 
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their evasion). That is, whether recognition for compliance raises or reduces tax pay-
ments hinges on what motivates taxpayers in the first place, with positive effects on 
the intrinsically motivated and negative effects on the extrinsically motivated. These 
qualitative patterns arise irrespective of the exact form of the compliance reward, be 
it in terms of social recognition, entry into monetary prize draws, or a combination 
of both. This suggests that the behavioral effects are driven by what such compli-
ance rewards signal about the tax institution rather than by the social/private nature 
of the reward. A natural interpretation is that rewarding taxpayers for contributing 
to the public good (rather than punishing them for not paying their taxes) signals 
the voluntary aspect of a poorly enforced tax system (and so positively affects the 
warm glow of donor types) and at the same time downplays the mandatory aspect of 
a legally binding tax system (and so may affect evader types negatively).
This paper contributes to the established literature on tax compliance (surveyed 
by Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002; Slemrod and 
Weber 2012), and especially advances an emerging literature using field experi-
ments to study compliance behavior (Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod 2001; 
Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001; Kleven et al. 2011; Fellner, Sausgruber, 
and Traxler 2013; Hallsworth et al. 2014; Del Carpio 2014; Pomeranz 2015). 
Despite the large amount of work on compliance, there is very little field evidence 
on the relative importance of, and interaction between, extrinsic and intrinsic moti-
vations to comply with taxes (see Luttmer and Singhal 2014). While we are able to 
make headway on this question due to the features of our data and setting, we note 
that these features may also raise issues of external validity. We discuss such issues 
in the next section.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides institutional background, 
Section III develops our conceptual framework, Section IV describes the experiment 
and data, Section V presents our empirical results, and Section VI concludes.
I. Institutional Background
The payment of church taxes is a legal obligation for all members of the Catholic 
and Protestant churches in Germany. There are two separate tiers of church taxes: 
the federal state and the church district levels. The state church tax is collected by 
state tax authorities, corresponds to around  9 percent of income tax liabilities, and 
raises billions of euros annually for both the Protestant and Catholic churches. The 
local church tax is collected by decentralized church authorities and is much smaller 
in size. The focus of our study is the local church tax collected by the Protestant 
church in a major metropolitan area in Bavaria, covering  68 parishes that comprise 
a Church District.1
By default, individuals baptized as Protestants (typically at birth) are church 
members and therefore liable to pay the local church tax once they turn 18. The vast 
1 The church tax is not unique to Germany: similar institutions exist in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, and Sweden. The local church tax also exists in other states in Germany (Saxony, Lower Saxony, and 
 Rhineland-Palatinate). The fact that the local church tax represents only around  9 percent of total church revenues 
is in part due to widespread evasion as we show below. 
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majority of baptized individuals do not attend church as an adult: between  0.8 per-
cent and  8.8 percent of eligible church members regularly attend church services in 
our sample parishes. Hence, our study is not based on an especially religious sample 
compared to the general population. We later provide evidence on the representa-
tiveness of our taxpayer sample.
We now describe three institutional features that are central to our study.
Tax Base and Tax Schedule.—The local church tax is a progressive income tax 
as shown in Figure A1 in the online Appendix. The schedule is a step function with 
an exemption level of €8,005 in annual income followed by 6 tax brackets in which 
the tax liability varies from €5 in the lowest bracket to €100 in the highest bracket. 
The tax base is a broad income measure (wages, business income, capital income, 
pensions, etc.) with no deductions. Importantly, the income components included 
in the church tax base are also taxable under the personal income tax and must be 
reported separately to state tax authorities. By defining the true taxable income for 
the church tax as reported taxable income for the personal income tax, the Church 
District is essentially leveraging on the far larger administrative capacity of the state 
tax authority. Reported taxable income may of course be subject to misreporting due 
to personal income tax evasion, but it is still defined as true income for the purposes 
of the church tax.
Tax collection and Enforcement.—The Church District mails a tax notification 
(shown in the online Appendix) to all resident church members in May each year to 
collect the local church tax. A bank transfer form  prefilled with the church’s bank 
account information and the individual’s local church tax number is attached to 
the notice. Church members are asked to  self-assess their income and taxes owed 
according to the tax schedule, and to transfer the appropriate amount to the church’s 
bank account by September. Although the church has the legal right to  cross-check 
 self-assessed income against information from personal income tax returns held by 
the state tax authorities (which would detect church tax evasion with certainty), they 
have never exercised this right in the past. In other words, prior to our field experi-
ment, there was zero deterrence in this tax system and hence any compliance would 
have to be driven by some form of intrinsic motivation.2
mandatory Taxes and Voluntary Donations.—It is possible for individuals to 
overpay their local church tax liability. Unlike conventional taxes, overpayments 
are encouraged and not refunded to individuals. As funds raised mostly remain 
within the parish, we can think of such overpayments as charitable donations to 
the local public good of parish services. This feature allows for the coexistence of 
tax evaders (who pay less than their legal obligation) and donors (who pay more 
than their legal obligation). We identify whether an individual is extrinsically or 
2 Individuals who do not pay their taxes before the September deadline receive a reminder in October requesting 
the transfer of the appropriate amount by the end of the calender year. If the payment has still not been made by the 
end of the year, no further action is taken by the Church tax authorities. 
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 intrinsically  motivated based on her actual past evasion/donation behavior under 
the zero enforcement regime.3
While these institutional features are useful for our empirical design, there is a 
 trade-off with external validity: the features that make this setting  well-suited to 
study motives for tax compliance are also features that distinguish our setting from 
other tax systems. Four potential threats to external validity are worth discussing. 
First, the tax is very small and this may affect compliance behavior, especially if 
inattention or other optimization frictions are important. We directly explore the 
potential role of attention/salience effects in one of our experimental treatments.
Second, the fact that the local church tax relies on zero enforcement may signal 
to taxpayers that, even though the tax is a legal obligation, church authorities do not 
consider it an important civic obligation. If so, this would undermine intrinsic moti-
vation and imply that our finding of substantial intrinsically motivated compliance 
is downward biased relative to other tax settings.
Third, if the local church tax funds a service that taxpayers value more than the 
public expenditures funded by other taxes, this could raise intrinsic motivations to 
comply relative to other contexts. To address this point, we note that our estimates 
do not differ much across church parishes with varying levels of participation in 
religious services. Moreover, to reiterate, participation rates in church activities are 
uniformly low and the vast majority of those liable for the tax are not regular church-
goers as adults.
Fourth, contrary to other tax systems, in our context it is possible that individu-
als contribute through direct donations to the church instead of via the church tax 
system. This would lead us to underestimate intrinsic motivation in the baseline 
(as some tax evaders could be contributing directly) and potentially overestimate 
the effect of incentives on revenues (as some of the effect could reflect substitution 
between direct contributions and tax payments). However, these potential biases are 
unlikely to be important in our setting: (i) private individual donations to the church 
are very small in Germany (as in many other European countries), accounting for 
less than  4 percent of total revenues for the parishes in our sample; and (ii) at the 
parish level, there is little correlation between changes in private donations between 
2011 and 2012 (the year of the field experiment) and the estimated aggregate change 
in tax revenues caused by our treatments.
II. A  Warm-Glow Model of Tax Compliance
To guide the empirical analysis, we present a conceptual framework that uni-
fies the standard deterrence model (Becker 1968; Allingham and Sandmo 1972) 
with the  warm-glow model of public goods donations (Andreoni 1989, 1990). Our 
3 Besides encouraging overpayments (donations), the social pressures to comply with church taxes are not 
very different from those related to standard personal income taxes: whether an individual makes a payment to 
the local church tax remains private information, and individual or aggregate information on compliance is not 
 communicated within or across parishes. Charitable giving is tax deductible in Germany, and this also applies to 
overpayments of the local church tax. Hence, there is no incentive to give to the church separately from the local 
church tax. 
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 framework embodies both extrinsic motivations (deterrence) and intrinsic motiva-
tions ( warm-glow) to comply with taxes.
We consider taxpayers with true income  z ̅facing a tax schedule  T  ( z ̅) under truth-
ful reporting. They decide on reported income  z and tax payment  T  (z) facing a 
probability of audit and penalty for evasion. Denoting consumption by  c , utility is 
given by  u (c, T  (z) , s) , where the inclusion of taxes paid  T  (z) as an explicit argu-
ment  captures the warm glow of giving, or intrinsic motivation, and  s is a prefer-
ence parameter capturing the strength of such intrinsic motivation. We assume that 
the marginal rate of substitution between intrinsic and extrinsic benefits  u T ′ / u c ′ is 
increasing in  s and equal to zero for  s = 0 . We allow for heterogeneity in intrinsic 
motivation, captured by a cdf  F  (s) . The  Allingham-Sandmo model corresponds to 
the special case where all individuals have  s = 0 .4
Agents choose reported income  z to maximize expected utility, which can be 
written as
(1)   (1 − p) · u ( z ̅− T  (z) , T  (z) , s) 
    + p · u ( z ̅− T  (z) − i  {z <  z ̅}  [1 + θ]  [T  ( z ̅) − T  (z) ] , T  (z) , s) ,  
where  p is the audit probability,  θ is the penalty rate on tax evasion, and  i  {z <  z ̅} is 
an indicator for evading taxes. This specification naturally assumes that warm glow 
depends on the voluntary tax payment  T  (z) in both the audited and unaudited states. 
That is, an evader does not obtain warm glow from being forced to pay additional 
taxes  T  ( z ̅) − T (z) due to an audit.
Consistent with our empirical setting, the model allows for taxpayers to fall in 
three different categories: Those who underpay taxes  T  (z) < T  ( z ̅) (evaders), those 
who pay exactly the right amount  T  (z) = T  ( z ̅) (compliers), and those who over-
pay taxes  T  (z) > T  ( z ̅) (donors). Changes in extrinsic or intrinsic incentives create 
movements across these three compliance categories (extensive margin) and report-
ing responses within the evasion and donor categories (intensive margin).
Consider first the intensive margin choice of  z , which is governed by
(2)  (1 − p) u  c n  ′ + p (1 − i  {z <  z ̅}  [1 + θ] ) u  c A  ′ = E [ u T ′ ] ,  
where  u  c n  ′ and  u  c A  ′ denote marginal utilities of consumption in the  non-audited and 
audited states, respectively, while  E [ u T ′ ] is the expected marginal utility of tax pay-
ments due to intrinsic motivation. This condition highlights the  trade-off between 
the extrinsic (consumption) costs and the intrinsic (warm glow) benefits of paying 
taxes.5 In online Appendix A.1 we formally characterize intensive margin responses 
4 Allingham and Sandmo (1972) did consider a case with social stigma from being caught evading, but the 
stigma idea is conceptually different from the  warm-glow idea analyzed here. 
5 In the  Allingham-Sandmo model, where  s = 0 , we have  E [ u T ′ ] = 0 and  i  {z <  z ̅} = 1, in which case (2) sim-
plifies to the standard condition  u  c A  ′ / u  c n  ′ =  (1 − p) / (pθ) . 
210 AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: Economic PoLicy AUGUST 2016
to changes in deterrence and the strength of warm glow. We show that, under a 
natural assumption on preferences, deterrence increases reported income for evad-
ers while it does not affect reported income for donors. The differential deterrence 
response between evaders and donors follows from the fact that enforcement is not 
a binding constraint for donors.
Consider now the extensive margin choice between being an evader, complier, 
or donor. The model predicts bunching at the point of exact compliance  z =  z ̅due 
to the fact that evaders and donors are treated asymmetrically: In the event of an 
audit, evaders have to pay the unpaid tax topped up by the penalty rate  θ , whereas 
donors are not reimbursed for the overpaid tax nor rewarded at rate  θ . This asym-
metry creates a kink in the consumption possibility set at  z =  z ̅and produces excess 
bunching at this point. Formally, assuming smooth preferences, there exists cut-
offs  s ̅1 ,  s ̅2 , such that a fraction  F ( s ̅1 ) of the population are evaders ( z <  z ̅), a fraction 
 F ( s ̅2 ) − F ( s ̅1 ) are compliers ( z =  z ̅), and a fraction  1 − F ( s ̅2 ) are donors ( z >  z ̅). 
The cutoffs are given by
(3)   u T ′ ( z ̅− T  ( z ̅) , T  ( z ̅) ,  s ̅1 )   ________________ u c ′ ( z ̅− T  ( z ̅) , T  ( z ̅) ,  s ̅1 ) = 1 − p [1 + θ] and  
 u T ′ ( z ̅− T  ( z ̅) , T  ( z ̅) ,  s ̅2 )   ________________ u c ′ ( z ̅− T  ( z ̅) , T  ( z ̅) ,  s ̅2 ) = 1,  
implying  s ̅1 <  s ̅2 and therefore excess bunching at  z =  z ̅for any positive deterrence 
incentive,  p [1 + θ] > 0 . In online Appendix A.1, we characterize extensive margin 
responses to changes in deterrence and the strength of warm glow. We show that 
stronger deterrence reduces the fraction of evaders, increases the fraction of compli-
ers (bunching), and does not affect the fraction of donors. Stronger warm glow, on 
the other hand, reduces the fraction of evaders and increases the fraction of donors, 
leaving the effect on the fraction of compliers indeterminate.
Our empirical setting starts from a baseline of zero deterrence in which the 
tax authority never audits (  p = 0 ). In this case, equation (2) shows that reported 
income  z satisfies  u T ′ / u  c n  ′ = 1 for each taxpayer, so that compliance is driven 
solely by intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, from equation (3), we have  s ̅1 =  s ̅2 
and therefore zero excess bunching at exact compliance. Empirically, however, 
we find strong bunching at exact compliance even in the zero deterrence baseline. 
There are two potential reasons for this that can easily be incorporated in the 
model. The first possibility is that intrinsic motivation ( warm-glow preferences) 
feature a discontinuity at  z =  z ̅. This would be the case if taxpayers are discretely 
more motivated to be  law-abiding than to be marginal evaders, naturally labeled 
 duty-to-comply preferences. This could be accounted for by allowing for a discrete 
jump in warm glow (a notch) at exact compliance. The second possibility is that 
exact compliance is a focal point and that bunching is therefore driven by atten-
tion or salience effects. As we precisely measure compliance in the zero deter-
rence baseline, we are able to estimate the amount of such intrinsically motivated 
bunching and to use our experiment to explore if it is driven by  duty-to-comply 
or attention.
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III. Design, Data, and Empirical Method
A. The natural Field Experiment
The Protestant church mails out a tax notification for the local church tax in May 
of each year. Our field experiment manipulated the content of notifications sent out 
in 2012.  Mail-out recipients were randomly assigned either to a control group or one 
of three groups of treatment. The first group of treatments simplify the details of the 
tax and correct any misperception individuals might have on audit probabilities. The 
second group of treatments manipulate deterrence parameters through the sugges-
tion of strictly positive audit probabilities or an audit probability notch. The third 
group of treatments offers compliance rewards/recognition.6
The online Appendix shows the format and content of the  mail-out letter for the 
control group (T1). The same  mail-out design had been used in earlier years. This 
standard notification comprises a cover page (with the remittance slip at the foot 
of the first page) and an information leaflet about church activities. The standard 
 mail-out clearly states on the front page that, “the local church tax forms part of the 
general church tax,” and that the “letter serves as a tax certificate.” On the second 
page it makes precise that the tax is “a compulsory contribution” and explicitly lists 
the legal foundations for the tax. However, in other regards, the standard  mail-out 
appears poorly designed: important details, such as the payment deadline and tax 
schedule, are only mentioned on the second page. We now describe how the  mail-out 
design varied in each treatment group. Table A1, at the end of this paper, overviews 
all the treatments and provides the exact wording used in each.7
Treatment Group 1: Tax Simplification and misperception.—The tax simplifica-
tion treatment (T2) makes two changes to the tax notification design: (i) it is signifi-
cantly shorter and makes salient the legal obligation to pay; (ii) payment deadlines 
and the tax schedule are presented on the cover page. All other design aspects 
remained unchanged relative to the control group. We might reasonably expect tax 
simplification to impact baseline evaders because some  noncompliance might be 
driven by them being misinformed/inattentive toward the local church tax.
All subsequent treatments then add one paragraph on the cover page of this sim-
plified  mail-out (as shown in the online Appendix). While it is well known among 
taxpayers that enforcement is lax in this setting, the misperception treatment (T3) 
aims to correct for any remaining misperception by making explicit that there is 
zero enforcement of the tax. This is communicated by explicitly stating that  p = 0 . 
We assigned twice as many individuals to this treatment than to any other treatment 
6 Following procedures from earlier tax years, a reminder was sent to  non-payers in October 2012. The reminder 
letter is the same for all and makes no mention of the original treatment assignment. The reminder sets a final pay-
ment deadline of December 31, 2012. 
7 Cagala, Glogowsky, and Rincke (2015) present evidence from a  small-scale survey among a random sample of 
those liable for the Catholic church tax in Bavaria: almost  90 percent of those receiving a tax notification confirmed 
they had read it. Hence, while our analysis focuses throughout on  intent-to-treat effects, the corresponding average 
treatment effects should only be slightly scaled up. 
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to ensure we had statistical power to detect changes in tax payments arising from 
potential misperception. The natural comparison is with T2.
As with the simplification treatment, we might expect responses to the misper-
ception treatment to vary across taxpayer types: some baseline compliers might 
have been paying the tax because they previously perceived  p to be larger than zero. 
By making explicit that  p = 0 , the treatment intends to fully eliminate extrinsic 
motivation for compliance, so that tax payments can only be driven by some form 
of intrinsic motivation. T3 therefore allows us to cleanly estimate the importance of 
such intrinsically motivated compliance.
Treatment Group 2: Deterrence.—The second group of treatments inject deter-
rence into the tax system. They do so by informing taxpayers the audit probability 
p is unconditionally set to some strictly positive value, namely  p = 0.1,  0.2 , or  0.5. 
These  p -treatments are denoted T4, T5, and T6, respectively, and make clear that 
the church district has the legal right to delegate tax enforcement to the church tax 
authorities, to whom a tax filer’s income is known. The natural comparison group 
for these  p > 0 treatments is the  p = 0 treatment, so that we pin down the precise 
comparative static impacts of deterrence through  Δp .
These  p -treatments were truthfully implemented in that income  self-assessment 
was verified, but in practice no monetary penalty followed if the individual was 
caught misreporting. Like previous tax enforcement field experiments, we do not 
observe individual beliefs about penalties. These beliefs are particularly difficult to 
gauge in our context, because the  zero-audit policy of the church implies that tax-
payers have never had to face penalties. However, the conceptual framework makes 
precise that any behavioral response to  p > 0 must reflect a positive expected penalty.
A final deterrence treatment (T7) introduces an audit probability notch: individ-
uals face an audit probability of  0.5 if they pay less than or equal to € 10 , and face 
a zero audit probability otherwise. There are two natural comparison groups to this 
notch treatment: the T3 misperception treatment that sets  p = 0 , and the T6 treat-
ment that sets  p = 0.5 for all payments.
Treatment Group 3: compliance rewards.—The final group of treatments 
are designed to reveal motivations for compliance through the provision of 
rewards/recognition. These treatments differ in the exact form in which the reward 
for compliance is provided. The first offers a potential reward in the form of social 
recognition (T8), through a small probability of an individual’s timely compliance 
being publicly announced in a local newspaper. The next two treatments offer entry 
into monetary prize draws as a reward for complying, a purely private form of rec-
ognition that is unannounced to others. There are two randomly assigned reward 
values (€250, €1,000), denoted Treatments T9 and T10. The final form of reward 
combines social and private recognition for compliance, so taxpayers have the 
opportunity to be named in a local newspaper and to be entered in the higher valued 
prize draw. This treatment is denoted T11.8
8 Rewards were offered for payments of at least €5 (not the true payment owed) to prevent individuals infer-
ring any change in likelihood of being audited. The winners of all rewards were drawn by lot, before local church 
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For all these compliance rewards, the probability of winning the reward is close 
to zero: for the social recognition treatment this follows from the fact that many indi-
viduals pay some church tax and are therefore potentially eligible for the newspaper 
acknowledgment; for the monetary reward treatment the notification makes explicit 
that the probability of winning is  1/1,000 . As such, these compliance rewards have 
essentially no impact on the (expected) extrinsic incentives individuals face to 
 comply, and so they should change compliance only if they impact intrinsic motiva-
tion. In particular, individuals may respond to the offer of such rewards if they affect 
perceptions about the nature of the tax institution. Indeed, a natural interpretation 
of such treatments is that rewarding taxpayers for contributing to the public good 
(rather than punishing them for not paying their taxes) signals the voluntary aspect 
of a poorly enforced tax system, and at the same time downplays the mandatory 
aspect of a legally binding tax system. If so, compliance rewards may have heterog-
enous impacts across baseline types, with donor types being encouraged to respond 
positively and evader types being more negatively impacted.
Finally, we also implemented treatments that provide information on social norms 
over compliance, or that use moral suasion. The literature has considered very sim-
ilar treatments (Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod 2001; Fellner, Sausgruber, and 
Traxler 2013) and so we do not focus on them. In the online Appendix, we discuss 
fully the weak effects of such cheap talk letters, very much replicating findings in 
the literature.
B. Data Sources
Our analysis links panel data from two administrative data sources: church dis-
trict records containing actual church taxes paid by each individual  T  (z) , and state 
income tax records containing true church taxes owed  T  ( z ̅) as implied by reported 
taxable income to the federal state. Church taxes due in year  t depend on reported 
taxable income to the federal state in year  t − 1 . The church district’s payment 
records cover  2008–2012, which we have linked with the state’s income tax records 
for  2007–2011 using information on names, date of birth, and zip code. The linked 
sample consists of  39,782 individuals that are included in the field experiment.9
Table A2 in the online Appendix presents evidence on the representativeness of 
our sample relative to other subgroups of tax filers in 2007, the last year for which 
 officials in December 2012, and immediately notified about their prize. Winners of the social reward had to provide 
consent for their name to be published. The advertisement thanking church members for their local church tax 
payment was published in early 2013 (after the final payment deadline of December 31, 2012 to avoid any impact 
on outstanding payments). Monetary prizes were paid in private in January 2013. 
9 Our administrative tax records allow us to observe tax compliance behavior across the income distribution. 
As the lower portion of Figure A1 highlights:  29 percent of our sample have an income below €24,999 (falling into 
the first two payment bins), while  13 percent of the sample have an income above €70,000 and lies in the highest 
payment bin. There are two restrictions on the data linkage. First, administrative records are available only for those 
that file a tax declaration. In the area our study is based in,  60 percent of Protestants file a tax declaration. Second, 
the tax base for the local church tax is individual taxable income. This raises an issue among joint filers: in the 
administrative records, individual shares of taxable household income are available only for joint filers who belong 
to different religious denominations. Hence, we exclude married couples in which both spouses are Protestants 
(thus ameliorating concerns over within household treatment spillovers). Given the advice of the church, we also 
excluded individuals 75 years old or older from the field experiment. 
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nationwide personal income tax statistics are available.10 There are only minor dif-
ferences in gender, age, children, taxable incomes, and income sources between our 
sample (columns 1a, 1b) and: (i) the general population in the same metro area (col-
umns 2a, 2b); and (ii)  non-church members in the same metro area (columns 3a, 3b). 
These  similarities are not altogether surprising: those liable for the church tax are 
individuals baptized, typically at birth, into the church; as adults, the vast majority 
of them do not attend church regularly and hence our sample is not skewed toward 
overrepresenting religious individuals.
The other sampling concern relates to attrition from our linked panel. Individuals 
can attrit for multiple reasons: falling below the tax exemption threshold, relocating 
outside the Church District, not filing a tax return, or  opting-out of the Protestant 
church. This last cause is of most concern for the interpretation of our results. 
However, rates of attrition are relatively low: less than  3 percent of individuals attrit 
each year for any reason, and  87 percent of individuals are observed in all years 
 2008–2012. In the online Appendix, we provide evidence on the correlates of attri-
tion, and summarize those findings as showing: (i) attrition is uncorrelated to treat-
ment assignment, and (ii) there is no differential attrition across treatments by past 
compliance behavior. Our working sample is based on those  89 percent of individu-
als ( 35,603 ) for whom we observe taxable income for up to four years  pretreatment 
(2008–2011).
Individuals were randomly assigned to treatment within strata.11 Online 
Appendix Table A4 presents evidence on sample characteristics and balance across 
treatments. Around  51 percent of our taxpayer sample are men, the average age is 
45 ,  42 percent are married, half have at least one child, and average taxable income 
is € 43, 000 . Column 10 shows an  F-test of the significance of the covariate set from 
being assigned to that specific group relative to the T1 control group (in brackets) 
and the T2 Tax Simplification (in braces). The evidence shows the samples are well 
balanced across treatments.12
C. identifying Evaders, compliers, and Donors
As we observe both actual tax payments  T  (z) and true taxes owed  T  ( z ̅) , we 
can precisely measure compliance at the individual level and therefore estimate 
10 In Germany, individuals are obliged to file a tax return if they receive business income or income from 
 self-employment: around  38 percent of the population files a tax return. Single filers comprise unmarried individu-
als and married couples who choose to file two separate tax returns. The vast majority of married couples are joint 
filers and benefit from the associated reduction in the progressivity of the personal income tax. One parent of each 
underage child is entitled to child allowances. Tax raising communities in Germany refer to religious communities 
that collect taxes within the scope of the personal income tax. The Protestant and Catholic churches are by far the 
largest tax raising communities and cover around  60 percent of the population. 
11 Two randomization strata were used: (i) the individual’s church tax bracket in 2011; (ii) the number of 
 pretreatment years the individual is observed for in the administrative records. 
12 The other key identifying assumption is that there are no spillovers across treatments. Four points bolster the 
credibility of our design on this point: (i) on  within-household spillovers, we reiterate that our sample matched to 
administrative tax records only covers households in which one spouse is Protestant; (ii) individuals in the church 
hierarchy were excluded from the field experiment, including administrative staff, priests, and a few historically 
generous donors; (iii) there was no media coverage of the field experiment; (iv) we set up a telephone inquiry line 
for individuals to call in case they had any comments/queries after receiving their tax notification: this received 
162 calls in total (corresponding to  0.34 percent of treated individuals), with queries mostly relating to the tax base. 
VoL. 8 no. 3 215Dwenger et al.: Motivations for tax CoMplianCe
 compliance responses to the different experimental treatments. What is more, our 
panel data allows us to measure  pretreatment compliance behavior from  2008–2011, 
a period with zero tax enforcement and therefore no extrinsic incentive to comply. 
This allows us to identify baseline compliance types under zero enforcement: base-
line evaders are those who underpay  pretreatment, baseline compliers are those who 
pay exactly the right amount, and baseline donors are those who overpay. These 
categories then proxy for motivational types, with baseline compliers/donors being 
intrinsically motivated and baseline evaders being extrinsically motivated. The abil-
ity to distinguish between these different types enables us to study heterogeneous 
treatment effects with respect to motivation, thereby speaking to the interaction 
between extrinsic and intrinsic incentives, and compare with our conceptual frame-
work, which predicts that those effects should be strongly heterogeneous.
While information on past behavior can be combined in many ways to define 
baseline types, we use a simple approach based on individual behavior in 2011, the 
year immediately preceding our field experiment.13 Using one year of data to iden-
tify baseline types is reliable in our setting because of a high degree of persistence 
in individual behavior across years. To see this, note that for the balanced panel of 
individuals in our control group that are observed for all years  2008–2011 that evad-
ers in 2011 had on average evaded for  2.79 out of the previous three years, while 
compliers/donors in 2011 had on average complied/donated for  2.09 out of the pre-
vious three years. Table A5 documents the high degree of persistence in individual 
behavior over time using a multinomial logit model. To summarize, we find: (i) the 
best predictor of current compliance type is lagged type, for example, those who 
evaded in 2010 are 87 times more likely to evade in 2011 relative to complying; and 
(ii) most other covariates have no predictive power on being an evader or a donor 
relative to a complier.14
D. Empirical method
We first consider extensive margin responses to the different treatments, estimat-
ing a linear probability model,
(4)  Prob (i evades) = α + βi ( T i = j) + π E i, pre +  λ s +  u i ,  
where  i ( T i = j) is an indicator equal to one if individual  i is assigned to treatment 
j ,  E i, pre is the number of times individual  i has evaded in the  pretreatment years,  λ s 
are dummies for randomization strata, and  u i is an error term. The coefficient of 
interest  β measures the percentage point impact of treatment on the probability of 
13 Columns 11–13 in Table A4 show the samples across treatments to be balanced within each of these baseline 
types. 
14 Older individuals are significantly more likely to donate. Those with wage income or liable for trade tax 
(a proxy for being an entrepreneur) are significantly more likely to evade, all else equal. However, the marginal 
impacts of these covariates are far smaller than the impact of the individual’s own past compliance. If there are 
high transaction costs of compliance, individuals might periodically pay large amounts so to, on average over time, 
pay the total payment owed. To check for this we examined whether those that donate in any given tax year are 
significantly less likely to make a payment the following year: we find no evidence for this pattern of payments. 
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evasion.15 We estimate an analogous specification for the probability of donating as 
a function of treatment (conditioning on the number of times the individual donated 
in  pretreatment years,  D i, pre ).16
We also consider total responses that combine the extensive and intensive mar-
gins. Here, we estimate the OLS specification
(5)  y i = δ + γ i ( T i = j)  + θ  y ̅i, pre +  λ s +  ε i ,  
where  y i is the tax payment of individual  i  post-treatment,  y ̅i, pre is the average tax 
payment  pretreatment, and  i ( T i = j) and  λ s are as defined above. In addition to 
tax payments, we also consider a coarser compliance outcome that gives us more 
statistical power: a dummy variable equal to one if the individual increases the tax 
payment over its  pretreatment level.
IV. Empirical Results
A. compliance in the Zero Deterrence Baseline
We begin by exploiting an important feature of our setting: that we can accurately 
measure tax compliance in a legally binding tax system with a zero deterrence base-
line. If such zero deterrence is well understood (as we largely confirm below), there 
should be zero compliance absent intrinsic motivations to pay taxes. Table 1 docu-
ments compliance in the baseline using data from the T1 Control group. Column 1 
shows the full sample, while columns 2 and 3 split the sample into evaders (the 
extrinsically motivated) and compliers/donors (the intrinsically motivated). Three 
points are of note.
First, a significant fraction of individuals comply in the zero deterrence baseline: 
20.9 percent of individuals make a payment greater than or equal to their true tax 
liability, while the remaining 79.1 percent make a payment smaller than their true 
tax liability. Second, among the evaders, 91.9 percent of them are full evaders and 
pay zero tax, while the remaining 8.1 percent are partial evaders and pay some tax. 
Third, among those that make at least the correct payment, 55.5 percent are exact 
compliers and 44.5 percent are donors.
These findings have implications for the compliance puzzle debate. The fact 
that almost 80 percent of individuals evade and 73 percent fully evade in the zero 
deterrence baseline implies that the  Becker-Allingham-Sandmo framework is 
70–80 percent correct in our setting. At the same time, there coexists a substantial 
fraction of individuals whose compliance is driven by some form of intrinsic moti-
vation not captured by the standard model: about 20 percent comply or overpay and 
about 27 percent pay at least something even though the tax system is completely 
15 If we leave out  pretreatment compliance  E i, pre and strata fixed effects  λ s , the specification corresponds to a 
simple comparison of means across treatment groups. We consider this unconditional specification in the online 
Appendix, and show that it gives very similar results as (4). 
16 All the extensive margin results reported are also robust to estimating a multinomial logit model for choice 
type  k (evader, complier, donor), conditioning on treatment assignment, the number of times individual  i has been 
of type  k (evader, complier, donor) in the  pretreatment years, and dummies for the randomization strata. 
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unenforced. Hence, both sides of the compliance puzzle debate may feel justified: 
while the  Becker-Allingham-Sandmo model is a good approximation for the major-
ity of taxpayers, it does leave out a  nontrivial element of intrinsically motivated tax 
compliance.17
 Duty-to-comply.—As the conceptual framework makes clear, individuals have 
no extrinsic incentive to bunch at exact compliance in the zero deterrence baseline. 
Such bunching requires either a discontinuity in intrinsic motivation at exact com-
pliance, naturally labeled as a “ duty-to-comply,” or that the point of exact compli-
ance represents a focal point for intrinsically motivated taxpayers.
Figure 1, panel A presents evidence on such bunching by showing, for those 
that make a positive payment, the histogram of differences between taxes paid 
and taxes owed in the T1 Control group. This shows large and sharp bunching at 
 T  (z) = T  ( z ̅) despite no extrinsic incentive to locate there. We use the bunching 
methodology developed by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) to quantify the 
amount of excess bunching at exact compliance: the bunching estimate shown in the 
figure,  b = 7.2 , implies that over 7 times as many taxpayers are observed at exact 
compliance than would be otherwise expected given smooth preferences as inferred 
from other parts of the distribution of  T  (z) − T  ( z ̅) . The strong tendency of intrin-
sically motivated taxpayers to comply exactly with the letter of the law can also be 
gauged from Table 1. This table shows that, among the  20 percent of individuals 
who feature some form of intrinsic motivation to comply, more than half of them 
locate at the point of exact compliance.
17 We note that the compliance/donation rate of 20.9 percent to the local church tax is far higher than those 
typically observed in  large-scale field experiments on charitable giving, where response rates typically vary 
between 2 percent and 5 percent for fundraising campaigns, despite those campaigns often being targeted to those 
with affinity toward the charitable cause (Karlan and List 2007; Huck, Rasul, and Shephard 2015). This suggests 
the local church tax is not viewed merely as a form of charitable donation, and that the legal obligation to pay has 
significant bite. This is reaffirmed if we recall that the vast majority of baptized individuals do not participate in 
church activities (with attendance rates less than 5 percent in the average parish). Hence, intrinsic motivation does 
not appear entirely due to behaviors confined to the religious. 
Table 1—Compliance under Zero Deterrence
Evaders Compliers/donors
Control group, means Full sample (extrinsically motivated) (intrinsically motivated)
(1) (2) (3)
Number of individuals 2,532 2,004 528
Percentage of all individuals 100% 79.1% 20.9%
Full evaders 72.7% 91.9% —
Partial evaders 6.4% 8.08% —
Compliers 11.6% — 55.5%
Donors 9.3% — 44.5%
Payment amount €10.32 €1.87 €42.40
notes: The sample of individuals are all those assigned to the T1 control group in 2012 (2,532 individuals). The 
column headings refer to behavior in 2012, the year of the field experiment. Evaders are defined as those who pay 
strictly less than their legal tax liability, compliers are those who pay exactly their legal tax liability, and donors are 
those who pay strictly more than their legal tax liability. 
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Panel A. Bunching at exact compliance (duty-to-comply) control letter
Panel B. Duty-to-comply versus attention simplification letter—control letter
Figure 1. Compliance Distribution under Zero Deterrence
notes: Panel A displays the raw distributions of the difference between payment made and payment owed for the 
control letter. In panel A, the sample consists of compliers and donors with strictly positive payments. Panel B plots 
differences in the densities of tax payments made–tax payments owed between different treatment groups. The 
objective is to see if bunching at exact compliance (demarcated by the vertical line at zero) responds to the tax sim-
plification treatment. Hence, panel B shows the difference between the T2 simplification group and the T1 control 
group. In panel B, the sample consists of all individuals. The bin size in both panels is 5 euro.
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It is conceptually difficult to distinguish between  duty-to-comply and attention/
focal point explanations for the observed bunching at exact compliance, and to some 
extent this can be viewed as a matter of labeling rather than substance. Nevertheless, 
in the next section we attempt to make progress on the distinction between the two 
explanations by considering how bunching changes in response to our simplification 
treatment, which makes the point of exact compliance more salient.
B. compliance responses to Treatment
Table 2 presents our core results on how tax compliance is causally affected by 
tax simplification (panel A), misperception (panel B), deterrence (panel C), and 
compliance rewards (panel D). For each panel we show both extensive margin and 
total responses in three samples: the full sample, baseline evaders (extrinsically 
motivated), and baseline donors (intrinsically motivated). The full sample results 
are presented in Part I of Table 2, while the results for baseline evaders and baseline 
donors are shown in Part II. The extensive response estimates are based on the linear 
probability model (4) for the probability of evading and an analogous specification 
for the probability of donating. The total response estimates are based on the spec-
ification in (5): the outcomes we consider are the total tax payment and the proba-
bility of increased payment. All treatment effects are reported as percentages of the 
average outcomes in the relevant comparison group, and at the foot of each panel we 
show the average outcome in the comparison group.
Tax Simplification.—Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of the T2 Tax 
Simplification treatment. Pooling all taxpayers, columns 1–4 show that simplifica-
tion (i.e., making salient the legal obligation to pay and making deadlines and the 
tax schedule more prominent) significantly reduces the probability of evasion by 
2.45 percent, and causes individuals to significantly increase tax payments by  9.73 
percent. The remaining columns in panel A show the effects on both margins to be 
driven by baseline evaders (columns  5–8). In this subsample of taxpayers, simplifi-
cation of the tax notification significantly reduces the probability of evasion by  2.66 
percent, and increases payment amounts by  43.4 percent. The fact that extrinsically 
motivated individuals are not more likely to donate (column 6) highlights that the 
primary response to the simplification treatment is largely driven by such individu-
als changing their behavior from being full evaders to being exact compliers.
On baseline donors, columns 9–12 show tax simplification has no significant 
impact on either margin of behavior. These null impacts suggest their tax compliance 
is not driven by them being confused. All the findings are robust to unconditionally 
estimated treatment effects as documented in the online Appendix (Table A6).18
Taken together, the results of the tax simplification treatment imply that a consid-
erable degree of tax evasion may be due to the complexity of tax notifications. Our 
18 We further note that all these findings are additionally robust to: (i) controlling only for randomization strata; 
(ii) excluding controls for  pretreatment behaviors; (iii) additionally controlling for the full set of individual controls 
shown in the balancing Table A4; and (iv) restricting the sample to the balanced panel of individuals observed in 
all tax years  2007–2010. 
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results contribute to a nascent empirical literature examining the real world impor-
tance of salience/information costs for taxes and benefits (Chetty, Looney, and 
Kroft 2009; Finkelstein 2009; Chetty and Saez 2013; Bhargava and Manoli 2015). 
Although not part of our framework, these findings can be couched in the notion that 
the complexity of a decision making environment drives status quo bias (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler 1991) or that subjects can only take a small number of tax rules 
into account (Eliaz and Spiegler 2011). Either interpretation is consistent with the 
documented responses to simplification and the high degree of persistence in behav-
ior over  pretreatment years shown in Table A5 for example.19
19 Boyer, Dwenger, and Rincke (2014) present evidence from a natural field experiment related to the equivalent 
Catholic Church tax in Bavaria. Their experiment is designed to make salient that the local church tax is legally 
binding. Their paper and field experiment were developed entirely subsequent to our analysis and the methods they 
use to measure intrinsic motivation are based on those presented in this paper. They find such manipulations of tax 
notifications significantly increase compliance among those identified to be extrinsically motivated, and actually 
reduce compliance of those identified to be intrinsically motivated. The first of these results closely mirrors our 
finding on tax simplification: some  noncompliance is likely driven by misunderstanding of or inattention toward the 
















Panel A. Tax simplification
Simplification versus control
 Effect of tax simplification   −2.45   −0.438   9.73   33.61 (0.971) (6.90) (3.73) (10.25)
 Average outcome in comparison group 79.29% 9.24% €10.29 7.89%
Observations 5,076 5,076 5,076 5,076
Panel B. misperception
Zero audit probability versus simplification
 Effect of correcting misperception 0.942   −7.23   −0.766   −10.60 
(0.889) (5.65) (3.05) (6.75)
 Average outcome in comparison group 77.30% 9.75% €11.65 10.92%
Observations 7,641 7,641 7,641 7,641
Panel c. Deterrence
Positive audit probability versus zero audit probability
 Effect of deterrence   −3.13   13.71   10.45   26.93 
(0.660) (4.59) (2.37) (5.84)
 Average outcome in comparison group 78.04% 8.93% €11.63 9.42%
Observations 12,692 12,692 12,692 12,692
Panel D. compliance rewards
Reward versus simplification
 Effect of compliance rewards 0.259   −0.040 1.24   −9.48 
(0.821) (5.23) (2.86) (6.21)
 Average outcome in comparison group 77.30% 9.75% €11.65 10.92%
Observations 12,632 12,632 12,632 12,632
(continued )
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Finally, we use the tax simplification treatment to probe further our finding of 
excess bunching at exact compliance in the zero deterrence baseline. As stated 
earlier, it is in general difficult to distinguish between  duty-to-comply and focal 
point/attention explanations for such excess bunching. One way to make headway 
on the distinction is to exploit our simplification treatment, which makes the point of 
exact compliance more salient. If attention is the main reason for bunching at exact 
compliance, one would expect bunching to increase in response to the simplification 
treatment. In Figure 1, panel B we therefore show the difference in the densities of 
 T  (z) − T  ( z ̅) between the tax simplification and control groups. The graph clearly 
shows that the simplification treatment does not increase bunching at exact 
local church tax. The second result links to our later study of compliance rewards, that highlight intrinsic motiva-
tions can be impacted by how the tax institution is viewed. 























(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. Tax simplification
Simplification versus control
 Effect of tax  −2.66   6.58   43.40   64.82   −5.25   −4.04   −6.65   −37.29 
  simplification (0.747) (22.86) (10.60) (13.69) (19.67) (6.97) (4.85) (19.38)
 Average outcome in
  comparison group
94.98% 1.91% €3.13 6.12% 17.32% 62.34% €39.94 15.58%
Observations 4,007 4,007 4,007 4,007 476 476 476 476
Panel B. misperception
Zero audit probability versus simplification
 Effect of correcting   1.53   −8.89   −9.83   −11.03   −16.75 1.52   8.79 32.37
  misperception (0.715) (17.47) (6.75) (7.55) (17.63) (5.78) (4.78) (28.02)
 Average outcome in
  comparison group
92.35% 2.18% €4.84 10.53% 15.92% 61.63% €40.16 8.57%
Observations 6,049 6,049 6,049 6,049 723 723 723 723
Panel c. Deterrence
Positive audit probability versus zero audit probability
 Effect of deterrence   −3.12   36.89   33.67   29.81   − 0.093   7.07   2.10   30.85 
(0.536) (15.22) (6.28) (6.64) (15.48) (4.22) (3.25) (19.16)
 Average outcome in
  comparison group
93.80% 1.93% €4.05 9.00% 12.55% 61.72% €45.08 10.67%
Observations 9,979 9,979 9,979 9,979 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261
Panel D. compliance rewards
Reward versus simplification
 Effect of compliance   1.27 5.24   −5.46   −15.58   − 11.64 2.02 4.87   48.34 
  rewards (0.664) (16.17) (6.33) (6.90) (15.11) (4.95) (3.83) (25.27)
 Average outcome in
  comparison group
92.35% 2.18% €4.84 10.53% 15.92% 61.63% €40.16 8.57%
Observations 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,909 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,247
notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations account for pretreatment payment behavior, dummies 
for randomization strata, and parish fixed effects. We split the sample into evaders, donors, and compliers (results 
not shown) based on pretreatment compliance.
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 compliance, pushing further the interpretation toward such bunching being driven 
by  duty-to-comply preferences.20
misperception.—Our ability to measure intrinsic motivations at baseline hinges 
on taxpayers being aware that there is zero deterrence. We now test this assertion 
using the T3 misperception treatment where we make explicit that  p = 0 . On all 
other dimensions this treatment is identical to the T2 tax simplification letter, which 
is therefore the natural comparison group.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results. Columns 1–4 show that averaging across all 
taxpayers, there are no significant effects of trying to correct for misperceptions on 
either the extensive or total response margins. However, breaking down the impacts 
across taxpayer types, the remaining columns show that correcting misperception 
does have a small but statistically significant effect on the behavior of baseline evad-
ers: they become significantly more likely to evade when they are explicitly told 
there is zero deterrence, and their tax payments fall (although this effect is not sta-
tistically significant).21
These findings confirm that compliance in the zero deterrence baseline is virtually 
unaffected by misperception and is therefore largely intrinsically motivated. That 
there is little misperception at baseline is not very surprising: the complete absence 
of enforcement in this established tax system is unlikely to go unnoticed, especially 
since this has been the status quo for a long time. Of course, while these findings 
help rule out misperception as a confounder in our setting, they do not imply that 
misperception is a  nontrivial issue in other enforcement settings. In systems with 
 nonzero deterrence, given that deterrence strategies are typically confidential, there 
remains scope for misperception among taxpayers (Scholz and Pinney 1995; Chetty 
2009; Del Carpio 2014).
Deterrence.—In the standard  Allingham-Sandmo framework, tax compliance 
is driven by extrinsic incentives due to audit probabilities (  p ) and penalties ( θ ). 
Panel C of Table 2 documents the compliance impact of higher audit probabilities 
by pooling together the treatments that inject strictly positive audit probabilities 
p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 (treatments  T4–T6) into the zero enforcement baseline. To make 
the variation completely unambiguous and increase power, we compare all these 
positive  p -treatments to the T3 misperception treatment in which  p = 0 . This elimi-
nates noise from idiosyncratic variation in perception.
Considering first the full sample of taxpayers, columns 1–4 show that increased 
deterrence causes significant reductions in the probability of evasion, increases in 
the probability of donating, and increased tax payments. Considering heteroge-
neous treatment responses in the remaining columns, we see that the deterrence 
effects on both margins are nearly entirely driven by their impacts on baseline 
evaders (the extrinsically motivated). These results are largely consistent with our 
20 While duty motives have been much discussed in the literature (Scholz and Pinney 1995; Andreoni, Erard, 
and Feinstein 1998), we are among the first to provide  nonparametric evidence of such effects. 
21 These responses among baseline evaders underpin the credibility of our experimental design: the fact that 
they are willing to evade more when told that the tax system is not enforced suggests that the notification letters 
were viewed as authentic by those taxpayers. 
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conceptual model, which predicts positive deterrence effects on the extrinsically 
motivated and zero deterrence effects on the intrinsically motivated for whom 
enforcement is not a binding constraint (see Propositions 1 and 2 in the online 
Appendix A.1).
Two further points are of note. First, the magnitude of each impact is quantita-
tively similar to those documented in panel A on Tax Simplification. Second, the 
weak response to these deterrence treatments among the intrinsically motivated 
speak to the literature examining the potential  crowd-out of intrinsic motivations 
from the provision of extrinsic incentives. For example, if intrinsically motivated 
taxpayers believe that under  p > 0 , other individuals pay taxes only because of 
deterrence, this could erode their own intrinsic or social motivation to comply by 
changing perceptions about other taxpayers’ true motives. Our results suggest that 
no such  extrinsic-intrinsic  crowd-out exists in this setting; if anything we observe a 
slight  crowd-in of intrinsic motivations.
In Table 3, panel A we break down the pooled impact into the separate impacts 
of each of the uniform audit probability treatments (again, we split the table into 
Part I for the full sample and Part II for baseline evaders and baseline donors). 
This reveals the additional insight that the deterrence effects are quite similar across 
treatments T4–T6. This lack of gradient could be an artifact of how individuals per-
ceive  audit-threat letters like  T4–T6: they may respond to the general message of 
stronger deterrence rather than the specific probability provided. Audit probabilities 
communicated through such letters are likely to be perceived differently than audit 
probabilities inferred from actual audit experiences over time. This is of course a 
generic issue for all tax enforcement experiments, not just ours. We next analyze a 
different kind of  audit-threat letter than what has been considered in the previous 
literature—namely the audit notch treatment T7—which works very powerfully and 
suggests that there is a gradient.
notched Audit Probabilities.—In the notched audit probability treatment T7, the 
tax notification letter announces  p = 0.5 for payments less than or equal to €10 
and  p = 0 for payments above €10. Such a notch provides a strong incentive for 
individuals who would otherwise pay less than or equal to €10 to pay just above 
€10 , thereby creating a hole in the payment distribution below the cutoff and excess 
bunching in the payment distribution just above the cutoff. The theory of notches 
and how to use them to estimate behavioral responses has been developed by Kleven 
and Waseem (2013). Here we build on their methodology by taking advantage of the 
fact that the notch is randomized.
The top panels of Figure 2 illustrate conceptually how individuals should respond 
to notches by comparing (hypothetical) density distributions of payments for indi-
viduals in the audit notch treatment group (solid red line in panel A) and the control 
group (dashed black line in panel A). The density for the audit notch group fea-
tures missing mass at and below the cutoff along with excess bunching just above, 
whereas the density for the control group is smooth around the cutoff as they do 
not face the notch. Panel B shows the difference in densities between the treatment 
and control groups: this difference will be zero above the bunch due to random 
assignment.
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The bottom panels of Figure 2 show empirical density differences between the 
audit notch treatment group and different comparison groups. The comparison 
group in panel C is the T2 tax simplification treatment, while the comparison group 
in panel D is the T3 misperception treatment. As the raw distributions are lumpy 
because most individuals pay in one of the statutory tax bins (0, 5, 10, 25, 45, 70, 
100), we show the distributions in €5 bins, and average densities within statutory 
tax bins. The qualitative findings are similar for the two comparison groups and 
consistent with the conceptual model: there is a large hole in the bins below €10 
and large excess bunching just above €10. The amount of excess bunching between 
€10–€25 (scaled by the average density in the comparison group below the notch) 
is shown by the estimate  b , with bootstrapped standard errors as in Chetty et al. 
(2011) and Kleven and Waseem (2013). When comparing to the tax simplifica-
tion treatment in panel C, we have  b = 0.42 : the excess mass above the notch is 
42 percent of the average density in the comparison group below the notch. When 











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Deterrence
Positive audit probability versus zero audit probability
 Deterrence, pooled effect   −2.45   −0.438   9.73   33.61 
(0.971) (6.90) (3.73) (10.25)
 Deterrence, individual effects
  Audit probability  = 0.1   −3.29 5.38   9.52   29.76 
(0.898) (6.08) (3.20) (8.05)
  Audit probability  = 0.2   −3.11   17.61   11.48   26.81 (0.923) (6.44) (3.37) (8.11)
  Audit probability  = 0.5   −2.99   18.27   10.38   24.17 (0.912) (6.31) (3.30) (8.01)
 Average outcome in comparison group 78.04% 8.93% €11.63 9.42%
 Observations 12,692 12,692 12,692 12,692
Panel B. compliance rewards
Reward versus simplification
 Compliance rewards, pooled effect 0.259   −0.040 1.24   −9.48 
(0.821) (5.23) (2.86) (6.21)
 Compliance rewards, individual effects
  Social reward 0.185 2.97 0.245   −11.60 
(1.03) (6.68) (3.51) (7.71)
  Small private reward 0.450   −4.59   −1.15   −10.88 
(1.03) (6.74) (3.56) (7.74)
  Large private reward 1.02   −3.30 2.12   −15.30 
(1.00) (6.60) (3.98) (7.63)
  Social and private reward combined   −0.618 4.75 3.74   −0.15 
(1.04) (6.57) (3.73) (7.89)
 Average outcome in comparison group 77.30% 9.75% €11.65 10.92%
 Observations 12,632 12,632 12,632 12,632
(continued )
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comparing to the zero audit probability treatment in panel D, the effects are even 
stronger: the excess mass above the notch is  62 percent of the average density in the 
comparison group. These bunching estimates are highly significant, much more so 
than the  uniform audit probability treatments considered above (and in the previous 
literature). That is, randomizing a notched audit probability vastly increases power 
compared to conventional randomizations of uniform audit probabilities.
Online Appendix Table A7 digs deeper by comparing both the notched audit 
probability treatment (with  p = 0.5 below a cutoff) and the T6 uniform audit proba-
bility treatment (with  p = 0.5 everywhere) to the T3 misperception treatment (with 
p = 0 ). To begin with, Column 1a considers the total average treatment effect of 
the notched and uniform audit probabilities. The effects are roughly similar in size 
(slightly larger for the notch) and highly significant for both treatments. However, 
the audit notch estimate obtained this way is attenuated because it does not account 
for the fact that individuals initially above the cutoff (where  p remains zero) are 
untreated. Hence, column 1b uses the bunching estimate in Figure 2D to obtain the 
Table 3—Individual Treatment Effects on Compliance—Part II (continued )



















(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. Deterrence
Positive audit probability versus zero audit probability
 Deterrence, pooled  −2.66 6.58   43.40   64.82   −5.25   −4.04   −6.65   −37.29 
  effect (0.747) (22.86) (10.60) (13.69) (19.67) (6.97) (4.85) (19.38)
 Deterrence, individual effects
  Audit  −3.09 14.43   31.69   34.91 15.80   −2.07 2.91 41.68
   probability  = 0.1 (0.741) (19.43) (8.73) (9.19) (21.44) (5.76) (4.38) (26.31)
  Audit   −3.60   44.22   42.19   29.86 7.45   10.92   −0.544 22.62
   probability  = 0.2 (0.773) (21.67) (8.89) (9.17) (19.63) (5.39) (3.94) (23.67)
  Audit   −2.69   52.86   27.48   24.55   −25.90   12.08 4.41 29.25
   probability  = 0.5 (0.749) (22.28) (9.23) (9.10) (21.44) (5.66) (4.11) (26.60)
 Average outcome in
  comparison group
93.80% 1.93% €4.05 9.00% 12.55% 61.72% €45.08 10.67%
 Observations 9,979 9,979 9,979 9,979 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261
Panel B. compliance rewards
Reward versus simplification
 Compliance rewards,   1.27 5.24   −5.46   −15.58   −11.64 2.02 4.87   48.34 
  pooled effect (0.664) (16.17) (6.33) (6.90) (15.11) (4.95) (3.83) (25.27)
 Compliance rewards, individual effects
  Social reward 1.02 17.93   −6.38   −16.84   −11.96 3.17 3.50 40.87
(0.824) (21.07) (7.99) (8.57) (19.62) (6.35) (4.66) (34.04)
  Small private reward 1.22 2.66   −10.10   −17.50   −11.95   −4.56 5.15   56.00 
(0.825) (20.60) (7.87) (8.50) (18.48) (6.32) (4.57) (32.76)
  Large private reward   2.09   −7.38   −10.57   −21.24   −4.55 2.72 3.16 35.00
(0.794) (19.69) (7.59) (8.34) (19.25) (6.32) (5.08) (32.38)
  Social and private 0.777 7.66 4.93   −6.95   −18.58 7.38 7.89   62.16 
   reward combined (0.841) (20.47) (8.34) (8.75) (20.02) (6.37) (5.24) (34.60)
 Average outcome in
  comparison group
92.35% 2.18% €4.84 10.53% 15.92% 61.63% €40.16 8.57%
 Observations 9,909 9,909 9,909 9,909 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,247
notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See note in Table 2 for details on control variables and definition 
of types (baseline evaders versus baseline donors). 
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correct local average treatment effect on tax payments. The estimated audit notch 
impact of 45 percent constitutes the correct comparison with the uniform audit prob-
ability impact of 29 percent, and so the notched  audit-threat letter induces a much 
stronger response than the uniform  audit-threat letter.
Panel C. Effect of audit notch treatment 
compared to simplification letter 
(audit probability notch - simplification letter)
Panel A. Densities in audit notch treatment 
and in control group (theoretical illustration) 
Panel B. Difference in densities between 
audit notch treatment and control group 
(theoretical illustration) 
Density in control group
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Panel D. Effect of audit notch treatment compared 
to zero audit probability letter (audit probability 
notch - zero audit probability letter)
Figure 2. Effect of Audit Probability Notch on Compliance
notes: Panel A provides a theoretical illustration of the distribution of payments made for the audit probability 
notch treatment (compared to the distribution of payments in the control group). Similarly, panel B illustrates the 
difference in densities between the audit probability notch treatment and the control group. Panels C and D display 
the difference in the empirical density distributions of payments made. The density distribution of the audit proba-
bility notch letter group is compared to the density distribution of the simplification letter group in panel C and to 
the density distribution of the zero audit probability letter group in panel D. In both lower panels, the dashed hor-
izontal line denotes zero difference in density distributions between the compared letter groups. The vertical line 
denotes the threshold at which the audit probability dips from 50 percent (payments below) to 0 percent (payments 
above). Bunching b is the excess mass just above the threshold (scaled by the average counterfactual density below 
the notch). In both panels, the sample consists of baseline evaders, who paid less than the amount owed prior to 
treatment (baseline year 2011). The sample is limited to those with payments weakly smaller than 150 euro. The 
bin size is 5 euro. We account for differences in the size of tax brackets below and above the threshold by averag-
ing densities within tax brackets.
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compliance rewards.—We complete our analysis by using the rewards/ 
recognition treatments to probe motivations for tax compliance. We first pool 
together all such rewards treatments ( T8–T11), and then later consider the indi-
vidual impacts of each type of reward (social recognition, monetary prize draws, 
and a  combination of the two). The comparison group is the T2 tax simplification 
treatment. As discussed earlier, the probability of actually winning each reward is 
very close to zero. We therefore view the salient feature of these rewards as being 
what they signal about the institution of the local church tax system. In particular, 
the offer of rewards for compliance (in contrast to punishment for  noncompliance) 
highlights the voluntary aspect of an unenforced tax system, which may have very 
different effects across different compliance types.
Panel D of Table 2 presents our findings. For the full sample, we show in col-
umns 1–4 that the offer of compliance rewards has no significant impact on either 
the extensive or total response margins of tax compliance. However, the remaining 
columns show that pooling taxpayers masks the considerable heterogeneity in com-
pliance responses to rewards across taxpayer types. Among baseline evaders (the 
extrinsically motivated) the offer of rewards/recognition for compliance causes them 
to: (i) significantly increase their probability of evading by  1.27 percent; (ii) signifi-
cantly reduces the likelihood they increase payments by  16 percent. Among baseline 
donors (the intrinsically motivated) the offer of rewards/recognition: (i) does not 
significantly impact their probability of donating; and (ii) significantly increases the 
likelihood they increase the size of their donation. This is remarkable given the con-
siderable levels of donation/overpayment among this type of taxpayer at baseline.22
Two further points are of note. First, the sharply heterogeneous effects of rewards 
across taxpayer types again highlight the importance of being able to cleanly clas-
sify individuals as extrinsically or intrinsically motivated for the study of tax com-
pliance. Pooling all taxpayers leads to the (incomplete) conclusion that the provision 
of rewards does not impact tax compliance. Second, by highlighting the voluntary 
aspect of an unenforced tax system, the reward treatments induce qualitatively sim-
ilar responses among baseline evaders as the misperception treatment that made 
explicit  p = 0 and, thus, also emphasized that tax payments are effectively volun-
tary. Baseline donors, on the other hand, respond as if these rewards positively shock 
their warm glow and thus  crowds-in their intrinsic motivations.
In Table 3, we report the separate impacts of each form of reward. Recall that 
these rewards are of three types: (i) T8: provides individuals with a purely social 
reward through the possibility of their name being publicly announced in a local 
newspaper; (ii)  T9–T10: provide individuals a purely private reward through their 
entry into small/high valued monetary prize draws; and (iii) T11: combined social 
and private rewards so taxpayers have the opportunity to be recognized in a local 
 newspaper and be entered in the high-valued monetary prize draw. Hence, the 
 differences between these treatments are whether the reward takes the form of social 
22 The spirit of these results match findings from other contexts in which very  low-value rewards motivate 
prosocial behavior. For example, Stutzer, Goette, and Zehnder (2011) find that offering lottery tickets increases 
blood donations; Chetty, Saez, and Sándor (2014) find that offering a $100 gift card to journal referees significantly 
reduces the time taken to send reports. 
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or private recognition and the value of the private reward. All other dimensions 
are held constant across rewards: the number of individuals named in the social 
 recognition  component of T8 and T11 remains the same; and in  T9–T11 the identity 
of monetary prize winners and their prize value remains private information.
Panel B of Table 3 documents a very uniform pattern of impacts across the dif-
ferent forms of reward, although we sometimes lose statistical significance when 
focusing on individual reward treatments. Across all three samples, the sign of the 
treatment effect is almost always the same for each of the individual rewards and 
for the pooled effect. For example, when considering the probability of increasing 
tax payments as our outcome, all four reward letters have a negative effect on the 
extrinsically motivated and a positive effect on the intrinsically motivated.
Our findings thus highlight that the offer of rewards can significantly impact tax 
compliance: the  first-order impact will depend on taxpayers’ underlying motivations; 
the form in which rewards are offered are less consequential in our setting.23 The 
heterogeneous treatment responses across taxpayer types reveals a subtle  trade-off 
for a social planner. The net benefit of offering such rewards depends both on the 
magnitude of responses for extrinsically and intrinsically motivated taxpayers, and 
on the underlying distribution of those types in the population. This is a timely 
insight given the use of rewards or recognition for tax compliance is becoming more 
prevalent, especially in developing countries. Moreover, over half of US states have 
utilized “name and shame” programs revealing top debtors (Luttmer and Singhal 
2014).
These results also shed more light on the potential  crowd-out/in between extrin-
sic and intrinsic motivations. We earlier documented that the manipulation of 
deterrence parameters (extrinsic incentives) had little impact on the intrinsically 
motivated, consistent with the absence of strong  cross-effects between forms of 
motivation. Our results on the provision of compliance rewards are consistent with 
this insight: the qualitative similarity of responses to social and monetary rewards, 
as well as their interaction, suggests that intrinsically motivated tax compliance is 
not  crowded-out by the provision of monetary rewards.24
V. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the large literature on tax compliance, and specifi-
cally to an emerging literature on intrinsic motivations for compliance (Luttmer 
and Singhal 2014). We provide novel insights on the relative importance of extrin-
sic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in a large representative sample of 
German taxpayers. We shed light on each motivation and their interaction using 
23 As such, there is little value added in discussing further the interpretation of the different types of reward. It 
remains an open question for future research whether social and private recognition can have different effects on tax 
compliance in other settings, say because social rewards leverage against intrinsically motivated individuals con-
tributing to the tax because they have social image concerns or a desire to signal to others their type or conspicuous 
generosity (Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson 2011). 
24 Gneezy, Meier, and  Rey-Biel (2011) review the field evidence on  extrinsic-intrinsic  crowd-out. Studies that 
find no such  cross-effects (in a variety of  non-tax contexts) include Dal Bó, Finan, and Rossi (2013); Ashraf, 
Bandiera, and Jack (2014); and Chetty, Saez, and Sándor (2014). 
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 experimental manipulations of deterrence, tax simplification, misperception, and 
rewards/recognition.
We make headway on these questions by exploiting unique aspects of our data 
and setting. Our data allows us to precisely measure tax compliance in contrast to 
many earlier studies (Slemrod and Weber 2012), and to cleanly identify  extrinsically 
and intrinsically motivated taxpayers based on their  pretreatment compliance behav-
ior in a zero deterrence baseline. Furthermore, the tax system studied is one in which 
overpayments are encouraged, thus creating the coexistence of evaders and donors 
and allowing us to integrate the study of tax compliance with the study of charita-
ble giving. While these topics have largely been studied separately, they naturally 
belong together as any imperfectly enforced tax system involves an element of vol-
untary giving.
We conclude by highlighting two directions for future research. First, our find-
ing that  20 percent of individuals pay at least true taxes owed in a baseline with no 
pecuniary incentive to comply suggests a need for more research that identify the 
key intrinsic or social motivations to comply and study how these respond to poli-
cy.25 We have provided evidence that  duty-to-comply motives may be one important 
mechanism in the context of taxation, but we have also shown that other forms of 
intrinsic motives play a role—and are affected by policies that provide recogni-
tion—for a subset of taxpayers who are willing to pay taxes above and beyond the 
letter of the law.
Second, while we find significant effects of deterrence and reward incentives on 
compliance behavior, the effect of these marginal incentives are relatively modest 
compared to the baseline evasion rate of  80 percent. When pooling the effect of all 
of our incentive treatments, we find that collectively they reduce the aggregate eva-
sion rate by only about 4 pp. In contrast, previous work has shown that  third-party 
information reporting and tax withholding is able to reduce evasion to almost zero 
(Kleven et al. 2011). Hence, while incentives on the margin do matter, this paper 
along with the recent literature show that it is not possible to make a tax system fully 
successful without information and tax collection systems that make compliance 
more or less automatic. The next generation of compliance studies should therefore 
provide more direct comparisons between the impact of marginal incentives—be 
they economic or social in nature—and the impact of mechanisms related to infor-
mational and administrative procedures. The  longer-term aim would be to unify 
separate strands of the recent economics literature, which have identified the impor-
tance of institutional/administrative features for individual behavior in contexts as 
diverse as  pro-social behavior, benefits  take-up, savings, and voting.
25 It is instructive to compare the levels of intrinsic motivation we document to those in DellaVigna, List, 
and Malmendier (2012). They combine a natural field experiment and a structural model to estimate the share of 
potential donors to a charitable cause that is intrinsically motivated. Despite their very different setting, they report 
a quantitatively similar share of individuals who are intrinsically motivated to give (25 percent) as we find in our 
zero deterrence baseline. 
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Appendix
Table A1—Summary of Treatments
Treatment Description
Wording of additional paragraph relative to tax 
simplification treatment (T2)
Control (T1) Tax notice unchanged
Treatment group 1: Tax simplification and misperception
Tax simplification (T2) Tax notice simplified
Misperception (T3) Zero audit probability Please note that, according to Article 9 para. 4 of the 
Church Levy Collection Act, the Evangelical-Lutheran 
congregation can delegate the collection of the local 
church tax to the church tax authority. The church tax 
authority can officially assess your income. However, the 
Evangelical-Lutheran congregation does not make use of 
this option. There is no verification of church members’ 
own income assessment.
Treatment group 2: Deterrence
Audit probability 10% (T4) Audit probability of 10% Please note (  … ) your income. In order to ensure a 
fair tax collection, we consider it necessary to verify 
the church members’ self-assessment for every tenth 
[fifth, second] church member. In other words, the self-
assessment of 10% [20%, 50%] of church members will 
be verified.
Audit probability 20% (T5) Audit probability of 20%
Audit probability 50% (T6) Audit probability of 50%
Audit probability notch (T7) Audit probability of 50%
for payments  ≤ €10 and
zero audit probability for
payments  > €10
Please note ( … ) your income. While there will be no 
verification of church members’ self-assessment for 
payments above €10, there may be a verification of 
payments at €10 or lower. In order to ensure a fair tax 
collection, we consider it necessary to verify the church 
members’ self-assessment for every second church 
member paying €10 or less. In other words, the self-
assessment of 50% of church members paying €10 or 
less will be verified.
Treatment group 3: compliance rewards




Among all individuals paying a local church tax of 
at least €5 no later than September 30, 2012, we will 
randomly draw 100 church members. If you belong to 
the church members drawn by lot we will contact you 
and ask for consent before publishing your name in 
a newspaper advertisement. With this advertisement, 
published in the [names of three local newspapers], 
we are going to thank the allotted church members by 
name for funding our work. Funds for financing the 
advertisement have been kindly found to this end.
Small private reward (T9)
Large private reward (T10)
Lottery, prize draw €250
Lottery, prize draw €1,000
All individuals paying a local church tax of at least €5 
no later than September 30, 2012 are going to take part 
in a lottery. From every 1,000 local church taxpayers one 
will be drawn to win a prize of €250 [€1,000]. The prize 
has been kindly funded to this end.
Social and private reward
combined (T11)
Lottery combining social
reward and large private
reward
Among all individuals (  … ) for funding our work. In 
addition, out of the 100 church members mentioned 
above, we will randomly draw 15 members who will 
each win a prize of €1,000. Funds for the advertisement 
and the prizes have been kindly found to this end.
notes: Treatments T3 to T11 are based on the simplified notice T2 and add one paragraph on the cover page rela-
tive to T2. We implemented two additional treatments on social norms and moral suasion (T12 and T13). See the 
online Appendix for further details.
VoL. 8 no. 3 231Dwenger et al.: Motivations for tax CoMplianCe
REFERENCES
Allingham, Michael G., and Agnar Sandmo. 1972. “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis.” 
Journal of Public Economics 1 (3–4): 323–38.
Andreoni, James. 1989. “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equiv-
alence.” Journal of Political Economy 97 (6): 1447–58.
Andreoni, James. 1990. “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow 
Giving.” Economic Journal 100 (401): 464–77.
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein. 1998. “Tax Compliance.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 36 (2): 818–60.
Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and B. Kelsey Jack. 2014. “No margin, no mission? A field experi-
ment on incentives for public service delivery.” Journal of Public Economics 120: 1–17.
Becker, Gary S. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 76 (2): 169–217.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2003. “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation.” review of Economic 
Studies 70 (3): 489–520.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2006. “Incentives and Prosocial Behavior.” American Economic 
review 96 (5): 1652–78.
Bhargava, Saurabh, and Day Manoli. 2015. “Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete Take-Up of 
Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment.” American Economic review 105 (11): 
3489–3529.
Blumenthal, Marsha, Charles Christian, and Joel Slemrod. 2001. “Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax 
Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota.” national Tax Journal 54 (1): 
125–38.
Boyer, Pierre C., Nadja Dwenger, and Johannes Rincke. 2014. “Do Taxes Crowd Out Intrinsic Motiva-
tion? Field-Experimental Evidence from Germany.” Unpublished.
Cagala, Tobias, Ulrich Glogowsky, and Johannes Rincke. 2015. “Who to Target in Fundraising? A 
Field Experiment on Gift Exchange.” Unpublished.
Chetty, Raj. 2009. “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The 
Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 (2): 
31–52.
Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, Tore Olsen, and Luigi Pistaferri. 2011. “Adjustment Costs, Firm 
Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (2): 749–804.
Chetty, Raj, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft. 2009. “Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence.” 
American Economic review 99 (4): 1145–77.
Chetty, Raj, and Emmanuel Saez. 2013. “Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings Responses to an Experi-
ment with EITC Recipients.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5 (1): 1–31.
Chetty, Raj, Emmanuel Saez, and László Sándor. 2014. “What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior? 
An Experiment with Referees at the Journal of Public Economics.” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 28 (3): 169–88.
Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, and Martín A. Rossi. 2013. “Strengthening State Capabilities: The 
Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (3): 1169–1218.
Del Carpio, Lucia. 2014. “Are the Neighbors Cheating? Evidence from a Social Norm Experiment on 
Property Taxes in Peru.” Unpublished.
DellaVigna, Stefano, John A. List, and Ulrike Malmendier. 2012. “Testing for Altruism and Social 
Pressure in Charitable Giving.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (1): 1–56.
Dwenger, Nadja, Henrik Kleven, Imran Rasul, and Johannes Rincke. 2016. “Extrinsic and Intrinsic 
Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany: Dataset.” Ameri-
can Economic Journal: Economic Policy. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol20150083.
Eliaz, Kfir, and Ran Spiegler. 2011. “Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing.” review of Eco-
nomic Studies 78 (1): 235–62.
Ellingsen, Tore, and Magnus Johannesson. 2011. “Conspicuous Generosity.” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 95 (9): 1131–43.
Fellner, Gerlinde, Rupert Sausgruber, and Christian Traxler. 2013. “Testing Enforcement Strategies in 
the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information.” Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation 11 (3): 634–60.
Finkelstein, Amy. 2009. “E-Z Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (3): 969–1010.
232 AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: Economic PoLicy AUGUST 2016
Gneezy, Uri, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel. 2011. “When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to 
Modify Behavior.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25 (4): 191–209.
Hallsworth, Michael, John A. List, Robert D. Metcalfe, and Ivo Vlaev. 2014. “The Behavioralist as Tax 
Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance.” National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) Working Paper 20007.
Huck, Steffen, Imran Rasul, and Andrew Shephard. 2015. “Comparing Charitable Fundraising 
Schemes: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment and a Structural Model.” American Economic 
Journal: Economic Policy 7 (2): 326–69.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1991. “Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 193–206.
Karlan, Dean S., and John A. List. 2007. “Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a 
Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment.” American Economic review 97 (5): 1774–93.
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen. 2014. “How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 28 (4): 77–98.
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, Martin B. Knudsen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Søeren Pedersen, and Emman-
uel Saez. 2011. “Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Den-
mark.” Econometrica 79 (3): 651–92.
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez. 2009. “Why Can Modern 
Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries.” National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 15218.
Kleven, Henrik J., and Mazhar Waseem. 2013. “Using Notches to Uncover Optimization Frictions and 
Structural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (4): 669–723.
Luttmer, Erzo F. P., and Monica Singhal. 2014. “Tax Morale.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (4): 149–68.
Pomeranz, Dina. 2015. “No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the 
Value Added Tax.” American Economic review 105 (8): 2539–69.
Saez, Emmanuel. 2010. “Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?” American Economic Journal: Eco-
nomic Policy 2 (3): 180–212.
Sandmo, Agnar. 2005. “The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View.” national Tax Journal 58 (4): 643–63.
Scholz, John T., and Neil Pinney. 1995. “Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citi-
zenship Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science 39 (2): 490–512.
Slemrod, Joel. 2007. “Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion.” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 21 (1): 25–48.
Slemrod, Joel, Marsha Blumenthal, and Charles Christian. 2001. “Taxpayer Response to an Increased 
Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota.” Journal of Public 
Economics 79 (3): 455–83.
Slemrod, Joel, and Caroline Weber. 2012. “Evidence of the invisible: Toward a credibility revolution 
in the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy.” international Tax and Public 
Finance 19 (1): 25–53.
Slemrod, Joel, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2002. “Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration.” In Hand-
book of Public Economics, Vol. 3, edited by Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, 1423–70. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Stutzer, Alois, Lorenz Goette, and Michael Zehnder. 2011. “Active Decisions and Prosocial Behaviour: 
A Field Experiment on Blood Donation.” Economic Journal 121 (556): F476–93.
